Abstract. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a country that relies on a signifi cant amount of remittance infl ows, has experienced a drop in these infl ows as a consequence of the global economic crisis. This paper aims to analyse whether and how this decrease is related to a change in motives for sending remitt ances. The change in motives will be analysed by exploring the interaction between social transfers and remitt ances using two household datasets, from 2007 (before the crisis) and 2011 (during the crisis), respectively. The analysis is based on the estimation of two model specifi cations, one that controls for the motives' non-monotonicity and another that does not. Compared to previous studies, this paper estimates the non-monotonic 'crowding-out' eff ect via an innovative empirical model specifi cation. Its fi ndings suggest that the predominant motive for sending remitt ances to BiH before the crisis was exchange, while during the crisis the senders of remitt ances were more altruistic. In addition, the results from the model on non-monotonicity of motives support the hypothesis that as a consequence of the economic crisis, transfer motives are changing in ways that are diff erent for poor and non-poor recipients of remitt ances.
Introduction
Up to now, the investigation of motives for sending remitt ances has commonly been conducted within a framework that analyses the 'crowding-out' eff ect infl uencing the relation between social transfers and remitt ances, in which a negative relationship would suggest altruistic motives, whereas a positive relationship would be indicated by other motives such as insurance, inheritance, or the exchange of services. 1 The ongoing global economic crisis off ers a unique opportunity to investigate whether and how the motives to send remitt ances were changed by the crisis, which aff ected both their senders and their recipients. Analysis of two Household Budget Survey (HBS) datasets from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), one from 2007 (before the crisis) and another from 2011 (during the crisis), allows the estimation of a model for the relationship between social transfer receipts and remitt ances to households. Comparison of fi ndings from data collected in these two years yields insights into possible changes in the motives for sending remitt ances from 2007 to 2011, a period conspicuously marked by the onset of the 2008 economic crisis and its continuing eff ects. It would not be appropriate to conclude, on the basis of these results, that the change in motives was due to the crisis, since many other, unobservable factors might have infl uenced the motives for sending remitt ances; however, the comparison of motives between the two yearlong periods can provide useful insights.
During the war in BiH in the 1990s, about one quarter of the country's total population fl ed the country. 2 Even today, it is estimated that every third Bosnian lives abroad. 3 As a result, the percentage of BiH's GDP derived from remitt ances (around 13%) is among the highest in the world. 4 Overall social transfers in BiH amount to about 14% of its GDP, the majority of which goes to pensions and health-care services. 5 But in addition, a large proportion of these transfers is devoted to non-insurance-based benefi ts, among them veterans' benefi ts, child-care allowances, and other forms of social assistance.
This situation, in which a nation has signifi cant private and public transfers, motivates an analysis of the possible interaction between such transfers. The link between receipt of social and private transfers is known as the crowdingout eff ect. 6 The sign of this eff ect, in addition, helps reveal possible motives for the sending of remitt ances. If the sign is negative, i.e. any increase in social transfers received by a household decreases the remitt ance income received; this suggests that remitt ances are driven by senders' altruistic motives. On the contrary, if remitt ances are driven by the exchange motive, they will increase when social transfers increase.
Remitt ances are well known as a countercyclical international fi nancial fl ow: their infl ow to a country increases during economic downturns because migrants abroad send more money to their families at home if their need for support increases. The global economic crisis has changed this dynamic, because it has aff ected recipients and senders of remitt ances. Therefore, the cyclicality of these fl ows is an empirical question.
This study investigates the presence of the crowding-out eff ect in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its change between 2007 and 2011, to answer the question: How do the motives for sending remitt ances change when senders face economic diffi culties? The social transfers to be analysed here are restricted to non-contribution-based social transfers, such as veterans' benefi ts and child-care allowances, because contribution-based benefi ts, such as unemployment benefi ts and pensions, cannot-unlike non-contribution-based transfers-be considered exogenous sources of income. As this study's key objective is analysis of the crowding-out eff ect, then contribution-based benefi ts, which are received as alternatives to wages, should not be considered exogenous sources of income that increase their recipients' overall incomes.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on social transfers' crowding-out eff ect on remitt ances. The third section briefl y explains the characteristics of Bosnia-Herzegovina's social security system and the infl ows of remitt ances to the country. The fourth section provides the theoretical model for the non-monotonic crowding-out eff ect and presents new specifi cations for two empirical models: one that controls for such an eff ect, and another that does not. The method and the data used for these models are also described. Section fi ve presents results of the estimation of diff erent model specifi cations. Finally, section six explains the policy implications of this study's results.
Literature on the Crowding Out Eff ect
Literature on social transfers' crowding-out eff ect on remitt ances has been concerned with investigating its direction and the linearity of senders' motives. Therefore, the theory about the eff ect has been empirically tested in cross-sectional sett ings. The ongoing global economic crisis off ers a unique opportunity to investigate whether and how the motives for remitt ances were changed by the massive international downturn-a crisis that aff ected senders and recipient of remitt ances alike. This paper is the fi rst contribution to the empirical literature that analyses the change in motives for the sending of remitt ances as a consequence of the recent global economic crisis.
The empirical literature analysing motives for sending remitt ances primarily uses the crowding-out framework, where the sign of the relationship between receipt of remitt ances and change in income, usually as a result of a change in the receipt of social transfers, is used to reveal possible motives for the sending of remitt ances. Remitt ances can be motivated by either altruism or exchange. 7 Becker's conception of altrustic motives for transfers is based on the idea of interdependent preferences. According to this idea, people have preferences about what others consume (e.g. parents have preferences about what their children consume) and consequently, the utility of transfers depends not only on their own consumption but also on that of others. Thus a migrant will increase the amount of remitt ance payments sent to family members left behind once their income has been negatively aff ected by adverse conditions in the migrants' home country. So if these transfers are motivated by altruism, a decrease in a recipient's income (as a result of crisis or reduced social transfers) will increase private transfers. This eff ect is interpreted as the crowding out of private transfers by public transfers. 8 This crowding-out eff ect implies that social transfers' positive eff ects can be neutralised by remitt ances, as the giving of support to vulnerable groups-the intended outcome of social transfers-will, at least partially, be transferred to senders of remitt ances. 9 The opposite eff ect is expected if the sending of remitt ances is motivated by exchange, resulting in remitt ances being 'crowded in' by public transfers. 10 If private transfers are predominantly motivated by exchange, meaning that such transfers are used as payment for the provision of certain services by a recipient to a sender, then the sign of the relationship between them is positive, because the rise in income of the provider of services through the receipt of social transfers increases the 'price' of such services. can be explained in the same way. For example, if remitt ances are motivated by the sender's self-interested intention to increase inheritance claims, then the recipient's increase in income also increases the expected gain of inheritance and, consequently, remitt ance transfers can be seen as an 'investment'. During a global economic crisis, however, the interplay of changes in income and social transfer among remitt ance senders and their recipients complicates the expected crowding-out eff ect. Moreover, such changes may aff ect people's motivation to send remitt ances, which need to be tested empirically.
Up to now, the majority of empirical studies have failed to fi nd a strong crowding-out eff ect between social transfers and remitt ances. 11 One explanation might be that most of these studies did not account for the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between public and private transfers. 12 An increase in income may cause the motives for transfers to change, thus causing the sign of the relationship between public and private transfers to be diff erent at diff erent levels of recipients' income. Such linear models are not correctly specifi ed and therefore cannot capture the true crowding-out eff ect. In addition, empirical evidence from developed countries that possess a long history of public transfers that may already have replaced private transfers might be misleading. Therefore, recent studies have focused on the collection of evidence from developing countries, allowing for a non-monotonic relationship between public and private transfers. Cox et al. investigated this possibility by a threshold model and estimated the transfer derivatives to be -0.4 for the poorest households and almost zero for richer households in the Philippines. 13 In a study of the relationship between public pensions for the elderly and private transfers in South Africa, Jensen estimates that for each rand increase in public pension income, transfers made by people's children were reduced by 0.25-0.30 Rand. 14 Although recent studies have addressed the issue of change in motives across income distribution, the present study is the fi rst to also address the change in motives over time. 
Remitt ances and Social Protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Background

Remitt ances
As stated above, the large forced migration during the war period in BiH in the 1990s put it among the leading countries in terms of receiving remitt ances as a share of GDP. Annual infl ows of international remitt ances, as made through the banking system only, totaled around 2 billion euros in 2011. These remitt ance infl ows provide a signifi cant source of income for a large proportion of BiH's population. Moreover, their total is six times larger than foreign direct investments (FDI) and three times larger than the development assistance it has been given. Data about remitt ance infl ows in the period 2002-2011, based on both the BiH Central Bank's and the World Bank's estimates, are presented in Table 1 .
There is limited evidence on the use of remitt ances in Bosnia. The evidence generally suggests that the majority of remitt ances are used for consumption. In 2005, Lianos reported the results from a survey of returned migrants, which showed that they mainly used their repatriated savings for current consumption, although a large portion (22.3%) was also used for the education of children. 15 In addition, 27.8% of respondents answered they used these funds for savings, which probably means that they will be used for other purposes later. Another analysis, presented by de Zwager and Gressmann based on data from a 2009 IOM/IASCI survey, reported that the majority of Bosnian migrants remit money back home (67.3% of migrants in the EU, 55.1% of migrants elsewhere in the Yugoslav successor statesia, and 63.6% of migrants in the United States, Canada, and Australia). 16 The average annual amount of remitt ances that migrants in the EU send to BiH is 2,800 euros, while migrants elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia send considerably less, only 1,200 euros. On average, these remitt ances are transferred in 4.4 transfers. Most (77%) are sent through informal channels. The most important purpose of remitt ances is the support of parents (40%) and other family members (20%).
The analysis of the HBS data shows that female-headed households, though more likely to receive remitt ances than male-headed households, receive on average less in remitt ance payments. Also, remitt ances to female-headed households 15 have a larger share in household consumption. Poor people on average are more likely to receive remitt ances than those who are not poor, but their remitt ance payments are on average less. Also, remitt ances have a greater share in household consumption for the poor than for those who are not poor households. The same applies for households in the Republika Srpska entity and in rural areas, although remitt ances have a lower share of household consumption in the latt er.
Social Protection
The social security system in BiH includes both contributory (insurance-based) and non-contributory (non-insurance based) social protection programmes. As in most countries, contributory or social insurance programmes are based on regular fi nancial contributions by benefi ciaries that provide protection against a set of predefi ned risks: e.g. ill-health, old age, disability, and unemployment. Non-contributory or social assistance programmes are based on two main categories: those targeting the poor population (means-tested programmes) and those not targeting the poor, which may impose further conditions governing access to and exercise of benefi ciary rights (conditionality). Benefi ts based on insurance include a) benefi ts from pensions and disability insurance, b) benefi ts from health insurance, and c) benefi ts from unemployment insurance. Besides these formal types of benefi ts, remitt ances as an informal form of social insurance are also very important in BiH.
BiH spends roughly 24% of GDP on its social protection programmes, including social insurance and social assistance programmes but excluding unemployment benefi ts. However, the level of spending is not the best indicator of the quality, eff ectiveness, or feasibility of its programmes. The largest share in the total expenditure on social protection programmes are social protection programmes based on contributions, i.e. health protection programmes (10.2%) and pensions (10.1%). Social assistance programmes cost 3.9% of GDP, more expensive proportionally than those in the EU and the western Balkan countries. Despite signifi cant fi scal outlays, non-contributory transfer coverage is low; a comparatively large share of benefi ts goes to those in richer quintiles. Non-contributory social benefi ts have a negligible impact on poverty, and nontargeted programmes have reached the limits of the fi scal envelope, to the point of crowding out targeted ones. According to a World Bank report, 12.4% of the BiH population reports receiving benefi ts in the form of non-contributory social assistance transfers (civilian or veteran-related). 17 However, only a small fraction of the poor actually receives the benefi t. A much larger share of the population reports receiving social insurance benefi ts (40%), with about half reporting that they receive some type of benefi ts (contribution-based social insurance and/or non-contributory social transfers).
Modelling the Crowding-Out Eff ect
This paper analyses the possible crowding-out eff ect of social transfers on remitt ances in order to fi nd evidence about the dominant motives for sending remitt ances, as well as how these motives have changed during the recent global economic crisis. Its fi ndings reveal the possible predominant motives for remitt ing by Bosnians and their dynamics over time, which can indirectly be interpreted as eff ects of the global economic crisis on these motives. 18 Two diff erent model specifi cations are outlined here. In the fi rst specifi cation, the motives of remitt ances are assumed to be monotonic. In the second, assuming that the motives for remitt ances are non-monotonic, the impact of social transfers on remitt ances was estimated based on the theoretical description of the relationship provided by Cox et al. 19 Cox et al. hypothesised that the relationship between social transfers and remitt ances should be negative at low levels of income, then begin to increase at some threshold level (K) such as the poverty line, as exchange motives supplant altruistic motives for the sending of remitt ances. But as income increases, the presence of exchange motives causes remitt ances fi rst to increase (up to the recipient's income level, depicted by I' in fi gure 1) and then to decrease and eventually cease (at the income level depicted by I''), making the relationship between social transfer and remitt ances negative in the fi rst part and having an inverse U-shape in the second. Cox et al. suggest that the appropriate specifi cation of the empirical model needs to be nonlinear to capture such a relationship and to account for non-monotonic motives by specifying a point where the break occurs. Moreover, 17 World Bank, Social Assistance Transfers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moving Towards a More Sustainable and Bett er Targeted Safety Net, World Bank Report, Washington/ DC, 30 April 2009, htt p://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/ WDSP/IB/2009/07/13/000334955_20090713024120/Rendered/PDF/AAA330BA0P11291C0Dis-closed071101091.pdf. 18 We compare results on motives for sending remitt ances in two years that coincide with periods before and during the crisis. As we do not control for all factors that might have infl uenced these motives over time, we cannot claim a causal relationship between the crisis and the motives for sending remitt ances, as there are other possible causes.
19 Cox / Hansen / Jimenez, How Responsive Are Private Transfers to Income? the break where the receiving of remitt ances ceases needs to be identifi ed. In terms of model specifi cations with alternative dependent variables, it should be noted that Cox et al. suggest the relationship outlined above for the amount of remitt ances received, but not necessarily for the likelihood that remitt ances will be received, which means that the theoretical discussion presented above of the non-monotonic and non-linear eff ect of social transfers on remitt ances should be controlled for in models only where the dependent variable is the amount of remitt ances. Compared to previous studies, this paper uses a new approach to the problems of non-monotonic motives for sending remitt ances. 20 In the second model specifi cation, the poverty line was chosen as a threshold point where the motives begin to change. We can assume that remitt ances to lower-income recipients may be more altruistically motivated, so they decrease after an increase in social transfers and their poverty-reduction goal may not necessarily be reached. Remitt ances to higher-income recipients may be motivated more by exchange and would therefore change in the same direction as social transfers. In such relations, social transfers would increase poverty and inequality among households, particularly when the receipt of remitt ances by the non-poor is matched with ineff ective social transfer policies. There is some evidence to support these ideas, but most studies have been based on the analysis of cross-sectional data, which does not assure an appropriate capture of the dynamic eff ects of changes in transfers. Therefore, it is necessary to test these ideas by using datasets from diff erent time periods. 
Empirical Specifi cation and Estimation Methods
In this paper's empirical analysis, the main research question is to be tested by estimations of six diff erent models. The fi rst set of three models (one pooled OLS for both periods, and two for each year separately) is based on the model specifi cation where the relationship between social transfers and remitt ances is estimated by including only the variable for the amount of social transfers, assuming that motives for remitt ances are monotonic. A second set of models (using three diff erent sets of data) presents the model specifi cation where the interaction term between amount of social transfers and poverty status of their recipients is used in order to determine non-monotonic transfer motives towards poor and non-poor households, respectively (i.e. to examine the switch from altruism to exchange as motivating remitt ances); the amount of social transfers are also introduced in a polynomial form in order to test for the possible nonlinearity of the relationship between social transfers and remitt ances motivated by exchange (i.e. above the poverty threshold).
The model to be estimated in the fi rst part of the empirical analysis is presented by the following equation:
where: Y-a dependent variable, expressed as an annual monetary amount of remitt ances received by a household, in increments of thousand Bosnian Marks (BAM);
Incpens-a variable for pre-transfer income, including pensions; tst-average amount of annual social transfers received by household, in thousand-BAM increments;
hh-set of household demographic characteristics which are hypothesised to infl uence receipt and amount of remitt ances, including: household head's gender (fh h), which takes value of 1 if household's head is female; age (age); education level (primedu, secedu, tertedu) , where primedu takes value of 1 if household head has a primary education; household size (hhsize); number of children in the household (numkids); marital status (marital), which takes value of 1 if household head is married; and employment status (empl), which takes value of 1 if household head is employed.
The second stage uses a model specifi cation that controls for the non-monotonic and nonlinear eff ect of social transfers on the remitt ance income received by households. The fi rst model to be estimated is:
where: Y, incpens, tst, and hh-as above, except that tst now shows the relationship between social transfers and remitt ances among non-poor households;
poor-a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a person is not poor, 0 otherwise;
tstpoor-interaction variable between variables tst and poor. This variable tests the hypothesis of non-monotonic motives for sending remitt ances, based on the poverty status of a household;
tstsq-squared value of TSTNP, in order to test the nonlinear eff ect of social transfers on remitt ances among the non-poor; u i -error term.
Recent empirical literature has argued that the majority of previous studies of the crowding-out eff ect did not properly address the endogeneity issue that arises from social transfers being typically targeted towards households that are in particular need of transfers. 21 But Bosnia-Herzegovina is an interesting case in this respect, as it is an exception to this rule since, as described above, most of the social transfers are category-based and are provided to non-poor people. In addition, several previous studies have suggested the possibility of reverse causality between the receipt of remitt ances and pre-transfer income, as remitt ances may aff ect individuals' incentives to work. 22 However, studies that controlled for this possibility did not fi nd any signifi cant change in their results. The two datasets used for empirical analysis in this study are the HBS surveys conducted by the Statistical Agency of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2007 and 2011. The surveys contain the comprehensive set of information necessary for this analysis. The samples for both surveys were around eight thousand households each. The data are repeated cross-sectional data with diff erent individuals, therefore limiting the options for appropriate estimation methods to be used.
Results
The results of the three models from specifi cation (1) are presented in Table  2 . These results reveal the average infl uence of social transfers on remitt ances, or the 'average' (monotonic) motive for sending remitt ances, regardless of poverty status.
To a large extent, these results are in line with those of previous empirical studies. They provide evidence regarding the expected infl uence of the key demographic characteristics on receipt of remitt ances, particularly place of residence, age, gender, and marital status of a household's head. Married household heads receive more remitt ance income. Female-headed households also receive more in remitt ances, which is in line with most previous studies. 23 Households with an older head receive less remitt ance income, all else being equal. We also found that several variables used in most of the previous studies, such as a household's size and number of children living in it, were statistically insignifi cant, so they were excluded in the model's fi nal specifi cation.
The main variable of interest in this study, the variable for social transfers, has a statistically signifi cant and positive coeffi cient in the model estimated with both 2007 and 2011 data, as well as with 2007 data only. This result suggests that the receipt of social transfers generally increases the amount received through remitt ances; that is, remitt ances are primarily driven by the exchange motive. However, this direction changes in 2011, which would indicate that in a situa- tion of worsened economic conditions among recipients, altruism becomes the main motive for sending remitt ances. This also suggests that remitt ances are still countercyclical, even when remitt ance senders are also experiencing the eff ects of an economic downturn. Table 3 presents results of the estimation of three models that control for possible non-monotonic motives for remitt ances. In model 3, the benchmark category is that of non-poor households. Consequently, the original coeffi cient for social transfers measures their eff ect on receipt of remitt ances by non-poor households. Its squared term tests the possibility of the nonlinearity of this eff ect among non-poor households. The coeffi cient for the interaction term between social transfers and the dummy variable for poor households measures the diff erence in the eff ect of social transfers on remitt ance receipts between the poor and the non-poor. As can be seen from Table 3 , the coeffi cient in front of the tst variable was positive in 2007 and became negative in 2011, which suggests that the main motive for sending remitt ances to non-poor households changed from exchange in 2007 to altruism in 2011. The squared term was statistically signifi cant in 2007, but was no longer so in 2011, which shows that the exchange motive was nonlinear, while the altruism motive was not. However, the coeffi cient in front of the interaction term between social transfers and a household's poverty status (tstpoor) changed its sign from 2007 to 2011, which suggests that the main motive for sending remitt ances to poor households changed from altruism to exchange.
Conclusions
The empirical analysis presented above is a fi rst study on the dynamics of motives for sending remitt ances during a situation of global economic crisis when both senders and recipients of remitt ances are experiencing a change in income. The results of the analysis should provide useful insight into the existence of a relationship between these two types of transfers and its change over time, possibly as a consequence of the global economic crisis.
The results suggest that the predominant motive for sending remitt ances to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2007 was exchange, which changed to altruism in 2011. Remitt ance receipts during the crisis decreased on average as a result of an increase in social transfers, revealing that remitt ance payments were infl uenced by a crowding-out eff ect caused by social transfers. Controlling for a possible non-monotonic patt ern in the motives for sending remitt ances, the evidence supports the hypothesis that diff erent motives compelled the sending of remittances to poor versus non-poor people. Moreover, the change in motives over time was observed for both poor and non-poor groups: remitt ances paid to poor people were primarily altruistically motivated in 2007, but this changed to an exchange motive in 2011, whereas for non-poor households the motives and their change over time showed exactly the opposite patt ern.
From a policy perspective, these results suggest that the eff ect of large, category-based, and ineffi cient social transfers is made additionally ineffi cient by the presence of the crowding-out eff ect on remitt ances. Consequently, inequality between the recipients and non-recipients of either private or public transfers widens further. Finally, infl ows of remitt ances cannot be considered to be a remedy for ineffi cient forms of social transfer, but on the contrary raise the importance of the proper targeting of social transfers.
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